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Abstract
Extending the Grossman [12] model of health capital into a stochas-
tic one, we analyze how the presence of Knightian uncertainty about
the eﬃcacy of health care aﬀects the optimal health investment be-
havior of individuals. Using Gilboa and Schmeidler’s [11] model of
maxmin expected utility (MMEU) with multiple priors, we show that
an agent retains the initial level of health capital if the price of health
care lies within a certain range. We also show that the no-investment
range expands as the degree of Knightian uncertainty rises.
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Uncertainty on the quality of products in medical care is more intense than
that in standard commodities, as Arrow [1] pointed out in a seminal article.
This study is an analysis of the eﬀect of uncertainty on health care behav-
ior. In the course of the study, a distinction is made, along the lines that
of Knight [15], between “uncertainty” and “risk.” Knight argued that risk
is characterized by randomness that can be measured precisely while uncer-
tainty relates to randomness that cannot be expressed by speciﬁc probability
distributions. According to this terminology, risk takes place when a unique
probability measure is assigned to each event, and uncertainty takes place
when only an imprecise information is available to assign a unique probabil-
ity to each event. Based on Knight’s argument, Ellsberg [10] suggested the
empirical importance of the distinction between risk and uncertainty.1
Extending Grossman’s [12] model of health capital, in this study, we
analyze how this kind of “uncertainty” about the eﬃcacy of health care af-
fects health investment behavior, and show that an agent retains the initial
level of health capital if the price of health care lies within a certain range.
We also show that the no-investment range expands as the degree of Knigh-
tian uncertainty rises. It is natural to assume that if people remain less
conﬁdent about their health condition and the eﬃcacy of health investment,
then they will hesitate to invest in their health capital because of the lack of
precise information on their health condition. Let us consider the problem
of being overweight. According to Puska, Nishida, and Porter [21], there
exist 1 billion overweight adults, at least 300 million of them are clinically
1Ellsberg conjectured that individuals wou l dp r e f e rb e t sw i t hp r e c i s eo d d st ot h o s e
with imprecise odds. For example, consider a bet on drawing a yellow ball from two urns.
An urn includes 50 yellow and 50 white balls, while, the other urn includes 100 yellow
and white balls, but the exact numbers of the two kinds of balls are unknown. Ellsberg
asserted that, in this situation, most decision-makers would prefer the ﬁrst urn to the
second. His conjecture was conﬁrmed by several experimental studies, such as those by
Becker and Brownson [5] and Slovic and Tversky [24]. See Oliver [19] and Wakker [25]
for a comprehensive account of the Ellsberg paradox in the context of health economics.
1obese. Puska, Nishida, and Porter [21] state that “obesity and overweight
pose a major risk for serious diet-related chronic diseases, including type 2
diabetes, cardiovascular disease, hypertension and stroke, and certain forms
of cancer.” Even though we recognize that losing our weight is necessary
for our health, in general, quite a few of us do not diet in order to lose
their weight. This paper shows that we tend to behave in this way when we
are cautious about the eﬀe c t so fe ﬀorts such as cutting the amount of fatty
and sugary foods and engaging in daily physical exercise. The reason that
people have diﬃculty in controlling their diet can be also explained from
the point of view of time-inconsistency caused by hyperbolic discounting as
mentioned in Laibson [14]. Or it may be because people cannot resist the
temptation of good food and have a self control problem as analyzed in Gul
and Pesendorfer [13]. This paper provides another angle to understand the
overweight problem from the Knightian uncertainty viewpoint.
While this paper studies the optimal health investment under Knigh-
tian uncertainty and shows that the degree of Knightian uncertainty can
reduce the amount of health investment, in the previous literature on health
investment, there are several related studies which also analyze the optimal
health investment under stochastic environments. Using a stochastic version
of the Grossman model, Dardanoni and Wagstaﬀ [8] showed that, under mild
conditions, a greater risk stimulates health care (health investment). Selden
[23] showed, however, that the result by Dardanoni and Wagstaﬀ can be re-
versed according to how the risk is introduced. Applying Arrow’s [2] model
of portfolio selection to health care management, Chang [7] constructed a
uniﬁed model including Dardanoni and Wagstaﬀ’s and Selden’s models as
its special cases. Moreover, Picone, Uribe and Wilson [20] constructed a
dynamic version of the Grossman model and examined the eﬀects of uncer-
tainty on health investment. Simulating the model, they showed that either
a ﬁrst-order stochastic dominant shift or a second-order stochastic dominant
shift in risk will stimulate health capital investment, especially in the early
2stage of life.
All of the aforementioned studies, however, included only risk factors
and, therefore, were limited to the eﬀects of risk on health investment be-
havior, while the role of uncertainty was entirely ignored. Because most
people have only imprecise information about the eﬃcacy of health care
behavior, it is quite natural to formulate decision-making problems by in-
troducing Knightian uncertainty. Thus, in this paper, using a version of the
maxmin expected utility (MMEU) model of Gilboa and Schmeidler [11], we
construct a simpliﬁed version of the Grossman model with Knightian un-
certainty and analyze how the presence of Knightian uncertainty aﬀects the
health investment behavior of individuals.
In the MMEU theory, an agent’s beliefs are captured by a set of prob-
ability measures and his preferences are represented by the minimum of
expected utilities over the set of probability measures. In a closely related
paper, Schmeidler [22] axiomatized Choquet expected utility (CEU) theory
and showed that an agent’s beliefs are captured by a non-additive mea-
sure and his preferences are represented by the Choquet integral.M o r e o v e r ,
Schmeidler [22] proved that, when an agent’s beliefs are captured by a con-
vex non-additive measure, CEU is equivalent to a special case of MMEU,
which endows CEU with the meaning of uncertainty aversion and makes it
possible to analyze his behavior under Knightian uncertainty through the
convexity of non-additive measures.2 Because we would like to consider a
2Let μ be a convex non-additive measure, be the set of probability measures on
(S,2
S), and let B(S, ) denote the space of bounded functions from S into .D e ﬁne
the core of μ by core(μ)= Q ∈ |(∀E ∈ 2
S)μ
0(E) ≥ Q(E) ≥ μ(E) ,w h e r eμ
0 is the
conjugate of μ.T h e n
(∀X ∈ B(S, )) X(s)μ(ds)=m i n X(s)Q(ds) Q ∈ core(μ) ,
where the left-hand side of the equality is in the sense of the Choquet integral. This relation
implies that it is the convexity of non-additive measures that serves the bridge between the
MMEU theory and the CEU theory, and makes it possible to analyze the decision-makes’
behavior under Knightian uncertainty through the Choquet integral. For deﬁnitions of
non-additive measures, the convexity, and the Choquet integral, see Appendix.
3situation in which an agent is uncertainty-averse, we assume that his beliefs
are described by a convex non-additive measure and analyze our MMEU
maximizer’s problem using the CEU theory.3
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section 2 is an illustrative
example based on the main result of this study. Section 3 is the main result
of this study presented in a formal framework of the CEU theory. Section 4
contains further analyses of the main result. Section 5 is the conclusion. The
deﬁnitions and some mathematical results regarding the Choquet integrals
and proofs of theorems in this study are in the Appendix.
2 An Illustrative Example
Incorporating Knightian uncertainty into a simple two-period version of
Grossman’s [12] model of health capital, we provide an illustrative example
that shows that an agent keeps the initial level of health capital if the price
of health care lies within a certain range.4 Suppose that there is an agent
who invests in his health capital, either in a positive or a negative amount.5
Furthermore, we assume that he is an MMEU maximizer and that he de-
termines his health investment on the basis of the worst-case scenario, that
is, his beliefs are captured by a set of probability measures , and his
preferences are represented by the minimum of expected utilities over .
Let p be the price of health care at t =1 ,a n dl e tX(s) be the health
condition at t =2i ns t a t es. We assume here that there are two states, good
3The models by Gilboa and Schmeidler [11] and Schmeidler [22] can explain the Ellsberg
paradox fairly well and have been widely employed by applied studies. See, for example,
Dow and Werlang [9] and Berliant and Konishi [6].
4This example is based on Nishimura and Ozaki [18].
5Typical examples of negative investment are to smoke heavily and to drink heavily.
It seems natural to consider only non-negative health investment. Even if we restrict our
analysis to the case of non-negative health investment, we can easily obtain essentially the
same results as those derived in this paper, that is, we can show that there exists a lower
bound beyond which he never invests in his health capital and the lower bound becomes
smaller as the degree of Knightian uncertainty increases.
4(g) or bad (b), and that the good and bad health conditions are X(g)=G
with probability qg and X(b)=B with probability 1 − qg, respectively.6
Moreover, we assume that he is risk-neutral and an MMEU maximizer and
that is the set of probability measures qg.7
T h ee x p e c t e dr e t u r nf r o map o s i t i v ehealth investment is represented
as
−p +m i n{qgG +( 1− qg)B |qg ∈ }. (1)
Similarly, the expected return from a negative health investment is given by
p+min{−(qgG +( 1− qg)B) |qg ∈ } = p−max{qgG +( 1− qg)B |qg ∈ },
(2)
where ”negative health investment” stands for the agent’s behavior that
causes damage on individuals’ health. As easily understood, the agent makes
a positive health investment if (1) is positive, and he makes a negative health
investment if (2) is positive. If both (1) and (2) are negative, he never makes
this health investment, that is, he does nothing for his health capital and
keeps his initial health capital intact if
min{qgG +( 1− qg)B |qg ∈ } <p<max{qgG +( 1− qg)B |qg ∈ }.
(3)
For simplicity, we assume that the true probability of his good health
condition, qg,i s1 /2, but because of the presence of Knightian uncertainty,
he is not conﬁdent about qg. In order to capture this situation, we assume
here that his beliefs are represented by a set of probability measures =
[1/2−ε,1/2+ε] for any ε ∈ (0,1/2),8 w h e r ew ec a ni n t e r p r e t² as the degree
6We assume that G>B .
7Since there exists Knightian uncertainty about his health condition at t =2 ,h i sb e l i e f s
cannot be captured by a unique probabilty measure.
8T h i sc l a s so fm u l t i p l ep r i o r si sr e f e r r e dt oa sε-contaminations.S e e N i s h i m u r a a n d
Ozaki [17] for an axiomatic foundation of the ε-contamination. In Section 4, we provide the
deﬁnition of ε-contaminations, and analyze the eﬀect of increases in Knightian uncertainty
on an interval in which the agent never invests in her health capital.
5of his error about the true probability. Under this setting, we have






B − ε(G − B)( 4 )






B + ε(G − B). (5)
Under our assumption that G>Band ε > 0, it is apparent from (4) and (5)
t h a tw ec a nh a v eas i t u a t i o ni nw h i c h( 3 )h o l d s ,t h a ti s ,t h e r ei sa ni n t e r v a li n
which he never invests in his health capital. Moreover, an increase in ε leads
to a decrease in the right-hand side of (4), and an increase in ε leads to an
increase in the left-hand side of (5), which implies that the interval in which
he never invests in his health capital expands as ε increases. Since an increase
in ε implies an increase in Knightian uncertainty, this result implies that a
lesser conﬁdence in the probability of his good health condition discourages
his health investment more severely. Finally, we consider a situation in which
ε = 0, that is, there is no Knightian uncertainty in the probability of his
good health condition. In this situation, (4) is equal to (5), which implies
that there is no interval in which he never invests in his health capital.
3 Health Investment under Knightian Uncertainty
In this section, introducing Knightian uncertainty into a simple two-period
version of the Grossman [12] model, we provide a formal model of health
investment. In order to analyze how the presence of Knightian uncertainty
about the eﬃcacy of health care aﬀects individual health investment behav-
ior, we assume that an agent is a CEU maximizer, that is, his beliefs are
captured by a convex non-additive measure, and his preferences are repre-
sented by the Choquet expected utility. Under this assumption, we account
for the existence of an interval in which he never invests in his health capital.
As we explain in Section 2, the existence of the interval is not accounted
for if an agent maximizes the standard expected utility, that is, if his beliefs
are captured by a unique probability measure and his preferences are rep-
6resented by the expected utility. Before we present the main result of this
s t u d y ,w ew i l lb r i e ﬂy explain the basic setup.
Let S be the space of the states of the world, let 2S be the power set of
S,a n dl e t( S,2S) be a measurable space. Let B(S,R) denote the space of
bounded functions from S into R.L e tX(s) denote the health condition in
state s at time t =2 ,w h e r eX ∈ B(S,R). Let H1 and H2 be health capitals
at t = 1 and = 2, respectively, and let H2 : R × R → R be deﬁned by
H2(X(s),M) ≡ (1 − δ)H1 + MX(s),
where δ denotes the depreciation rate and M ∈ R denotes the amount of
health investment.9 We assume that an agent’s income depends on the level
of his health capital and that the income-generating function Ψ : R → R
is a function of the health capital at t =2 ,H2,w h e r eΨ is concave and
continuously diﬀerentiable with Ψ0(·) > 0a n dΨ00(·) ≤ 0.10
Let A, Y1 and p denote the initial wealth, the income at t =1 ,a n dt h e
price of health capital, respectively. We assume that u : R → R is a concave
and twice-continuously diﬀerentiable function with u0(·) > 0a n du00(·) ≤ 0.
M o r e o v e r ,w ea s s u m et h a ta na g e n ti suncertainty averse and that he has
to decide whether or not to make a health investment at t =1 . 11 The
objective is to choose the amount of the health investment M in order to
9Even if we consider an additive case such as
H2(X(s),M)=( 1− δ)H1 + I(M)+X(s),
the result is not essentially aﬀected. That is, we can derive the existence of the no-
investment intaval. Note that in this additive case, the interval obtained is not the same
as the one in Theorem 1.
10Chang [7] deﬁnes H2 : → by H2(M)=( 1− δ)H1 + I(M), where I : →
denotes some production function satisfying some regularity conditions. Moreover, he
assumes that the income-generating function Ψ : × → is a real-valued function
of the amount of the health investment M and some random variable ε, satisfying some
regularity conditions, denoted by Ψ(H2,ε). If we assume that limM→0 I
0(M)e x i s t sa n d
is ﬁnite, then we can also derive our main result within his framework.
11As we explain in Introduction, we assume that agent’s beliefs are captured by a convex
non-additive measure, and her preferences are represented by the Choquet integral.
7maximize Z
u((A + Y1 − pM)+Ψ(H2(X(s),M)))μ(ds),
where μ is a convex non-additive measure and the integral is in the sense
of the Choquet integral. This agent is assumed to maximize his Choquet
expected utility of his terminal wealth with a convex non-additive measure.
In this setting, we have the following theorem.











where μ0 is the conjugate of μ. Then, the agent never invests in this health
capital.
The integrand dΨ/dH2X denotes the marginal product of the health
investment evaluated at M = 0. If this agent’s beliefs are captured by a
probability measure, then the interval does not exist. This theorem im-
plies that the decreased conﬁdence in his health condition at t =2m a k e s
him hesitate about the health investment in either a positive or a negative
direction.
It is worth mentioning the economic mechanism that leads to our main
result. In the two-period model of our paper, the reason that individuals in-
vest in health is because it will bring a better health status tomorrow, which
in turn will increase the income tomorrow. The presence of Knightian un-
certainty makes the health condition tomorrow very uncertain. It discounts
the expected return of the health investment and makes individuals more
likely not engaged in the health investment.
4 A nI n c r e a s ei nK n i g h t i a nU n c e r t a i n t y
In this section, we analyze the eﬀect of increases in the degree of Knightian
uncertainty on the interval in which the agent does not invest in his health
8capital and show that an increase in the degree of the Knightian uncertainty
expands the length of the interval. For that purpose, we assume that his
beliefs are captured by the ε-contamination of the true probability measure
P0.12
First, a formal deﬁnition of ε-contaminations is presented. Let P0 be
the true probability measure about his health condition at t =2 ,a n dl e t
ε ∈ (0,1). The ε-contamination of P0 is deﬁned by
P0 ≡ {(1 − ε)P0 + εQ|Q ∈ }.
If his beliefs are captured by the ε-contamination of P0, then, with (1 −
ε) × 100%, he is certain about the true probability measure of his future
health condition, but, with ε × 100%, he fears that his beliefs in his future
health condition are completely wrong. If ε = 0, then the set of probability
measures P0 is reduced to the singleton, P0. An increase in ε implies that
an agent is more uncertain about the true probability measure P0.T h u s ,ε
can be considered to be a parameter that captures the degree of Knightian
uncertainty.13
Let ε0 and ε be in (0,1), let ε0 > ε, and deﬁne θ1 and θ2 by
(∀E) θ1(E)=
½
(1 − ε0)P0(E)i fE 6= S




(1 − ε)P0(E)i fE 6= S
1i f E = S,
(7)
where E is an event and P0 is a probability measure on (S,2S). It can be
shown that θ1 and θ2 are convex non-additive measures and that core(θ1)=
P1 and core(θ2)=P2,w h e r eP1 ≡ {(1 − ε0)P0 + ε0Q|Q ∈ } and P2 ≡
{(1 − ε)P0 + εQ|Q ∈ }. Therefore, the intervals of an agent whose beliefs
are represented by the ε0-contamination of P0 and the ε-contamination of
12A sw ee x p l a i ni nt h i ss e c t i o n ,t h eε-contamination of P0 can be represented by core of
some convex non-additive measure. Therefore, an agent can be considered to be a CEU
maximizer as in Section 3. For the relation between MMEU and CEU, see footnote 2.


























Our main theorem on the eﬀect of Knightian uncertainty is as follows:
Theorem 2. If the degree of Knightian uncertainty increases, then the in-
terval in which the agent does not invest in his health capital expands.
Proof. See Appendix.
This theorem states that the more uncertainty averse he is about his
future health condition, the more he hesitates about his health investment
in either a positive or a negative direction. As mentioned in Introduction,
even though we recognize that losing our weight is necessary for our health,
in general, quite a few of us do not diet in order to lose their weight. This
kind of behavior can be explained by Theorem 2. Moreover, this theorem
implies that the more cautious we get about eﬀects of diet, the less we diet.
5C o n c l u s i o n
Introducing Knightian uncertainty into the Grossman [12] model of health
capital, we analyzed the eﬀect of Knightian uncertainty on the health invest-
ment behavior of individuals. We showed that, in the presence of Knightian
uncertainty, when the price of health care lies within a certain interval, an
agent does nothing, that is, he keeps the initial level of his health capital.
We also showed that the length of the no-investment interval expands as the
degree of uncertainty increases.
10Appendix
Let (S,2S) be a measurable space. A set function μ :2 S → [0,1] is a
non-additive measure (or normalized capacity) if (a) μ(∅) = 0, (b) μ(S)=1 ,
and (c) E, F ∈ 2S and E ⊂ F imply μ(E) ≤ μ(F), where ∅ denotes the
empty set. A non-additive measure μ is convex if μ(E ∪ F)+μ(E ∩ F) ≥
μ(E)+μ(F) for all E,F ∈ 2S.L e tμ be a non-additive measure on (S,2S).
Then, the conjugate μ0 of μ is deﬁned by μ0(E)=1− μ(Ec) for all E ∈ 2S,
where Ec denotes the complement of E.
Let B(S,R) denote the space of bounded functions from S into R and
let X ∈ B(S,R). The integral of X with respect to a non-additive measure






μ({s ∈ S|X(s) ≥ α})dα +
Z 0
−∞
[μ({s ∈ S|X(s) ≥ α}) − 1]dα,
where integrals on the right hand side are in the sense of Riemann integrals.
Fact 1.

















where μ0 is the conjugate of μ.
Fact 4 (Schmeidler [22]). Let μ be a convex non-additive measure, and let




















¯ ¯ ¯Q ∈ core(μ)
¾
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Since μ is convex, the set (μ,X) is non-empty.
Let h : S × R → R satisfy the following:
(∀z ∈ R) h(·,z)i sm e a s u r a b l e ( 8 )
(∀z ∈ R) h(s,·)i sd i ﬀerentiable and concave (9)
Then,
R
S h(s,z)μ(ds) is concave with respect to z if μ is convex.
Proposition 1. Let μ be a convex non-additive measure, and let h : S×R →






















¯ ¯Q ∈ (μ,h(·,z))
¾
,
where d/dz− and d/dz+ denote the right derivative and the left derivative,
respectively.
Proof. See Aubin [4].
Proof of Theorem 1. Let f : R → R be deﬁned by f(M)=
R
u((A + Y1 − pM)+Ψ(H2(X(s),M)))μ(ds). From Fact 5 together with
12the assumptions that Ψ and u are concave, it follows that f is a concave
































¯ ¯ ¯Q ∈ (μ,u(W))
¾
< 0 < max
½Z
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where the ﬁrst equivalence follows from u0(·) > 0a n d (μ,u(W)) = core(μ),
and the second equivalence follows from Fact 4.
Proof of Theorem 2. In order to prove Theorem 2, we provide the concept
of b e i n gm o r eu n c e r t a i n t ya v e r s eproposed by Dow and Werlang [9] and
present mathematical results related to the concept. Let μ, μ1,a n dμ2
be non-additive measures on (S,2S), and let c(μ,A) ≡ 1 − μ(A) − μ(Ac).
Dow and Werlang [9] state that μ1 is more uncertainty averse than μ2 if
c(μ1,A) ≥ c(μ2,A) for all A.
Theorem 3 (Dow and Werlang [9]). Let μ1 and μ2 be non-additive measures
on (S,2S). Then, the following statements are equivalent.
(i) μ1 is more uncertainty averse than μ2.













2 are conjugates of μ1 and μ2, respectively.
13Lemma 1. Let ε0 and ε be in (0,1).L e t θ1 and θ2 be deﬁned by (6) and
(7), respectively. If ε0 > ε,t h e nc(θ1,E) ≥ c(θ2,E) for all E.
Proof. The proof is immediate.
Combining Theorem 3 and Lemma 1 proves Theorem 2.
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